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Sartre’s claim to have founded a humanistic ethics of freedom has met with
considerable opposition.1 Though viewed sympathetically by a small minor-
ity of commentators,2 the majority verdict has been that Sartre’s ethical
rhetoric, his assertion of human freedom as a supreme value, deﬂates on
examination and leaves behind a radical subjectivism indistinguishable from
moral nihilism. On the standard construal, Sartre allows nothing to ﬁgure as a
ground of value save the individual’s bare consciousness of their own power
of self-determination, and in consequence the Sartrean subject is required to
make a rationally ungrounded choice in favour of some or other arbitrary
value, commitment to which is unconditional yet can be maintained only
through sheer force of will.3 Sartre may then be regarded as exemplary of the
predicament of late modern ethics, committed to the inﬁnite value of the
individual but without any theological or other supporting context for this
I am grateful to Sarah Richmond for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1 I do not follow any strict systematic distinction inmy usage of “ethical” and “moral,”
but generally intend the former to have broader scope and the latter to refer to
ethical values that have taken determinate imperatival shape.
2 Typically these commentators are sensitive to Sartre’s continuity with Kant: see esp.
Baiasu 2011. For further general discussion of Sartre’s ethics, see Anderson 1979 and
1993, Baldwin 1986, Bell 1989, Detmer 1988, Flynn 1984, McBride 1991, chs. 1–2,
Poellner 2012, and Simont 1992.
3 Exemplifying this assessment, in the earliest anglophone literature on Sartre, see
Alfred Stern’s short and straightforward discussion in Stern 1953, chs. 10–11; Stern’s
association of Sartre with Nietzsche is characteristic. Alvin Plantinga gives the
standard grounds for dissatisfaction with Sartre’s ethical claims in Plantinga 1958:
245–50. While analytic philosophers have been prominent in attacking Sartre’s
ethics, commentators in this camp share a variety of orientations and can be
found in Sartre’s earliest reception: see, e.g., Marcel 1948 and Lefebvre 2003, both
from 1946.
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doctrine,4 or alternatively, as an object-lesson in the impossibility of uphold-
ing a broadly Kantian view of the centrality of individual freedom to morality
without the accompanying apparatus of Kant’s pure practical reason and
metaphysics of the intelligible.
If this judgement is correct, then a cruel irony aﬄicts Sartre’s philosophical
project as a whole, which aims precisely to steer phenomenology in an ethical
direction. From his earliest writings, which broach particular topics in theo-
retical philosophy on account of their perceived practical implications,5 Sartre
regarded philosophical enquiry as addressing the question of how one should
lead one’s life, paralleling his treatment in literature of the vicissitudes of
human aspiration.
Various circumstantial facts help to explain the predominantly negative
reception of Sartre’s ethics, above all, the absence of any single published text
in which his position receives the kind of detailed exposition and defence with
which the phenomenological ontology of Being and Nothingness is equipped.6
The chief obstacle to a correct appreciation of Sartre’s contribution to moral
thought, however, lies in the failure to recognize the nature of the strategy he
employs, which is of a kind not currently favoured or even regarded as viable.
4 See MacIntyre 1981, ch. 3. MacIntyre’s approach to Sartre from the standpoint of
analytic meta-ethics is representative of much earlier commentary; see, e.g., Danto
1975, ch. 5.
5 See The Transcendence of the Ego (TE), Conclusion; Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions
(Sartre 1971), passim, and The Imaginary (Sartre 2004a), ch. 4. Abbreviations are
explained at the end of the chapter.
6 The chief writings of Sartre’s relevant to his ethical theory are as follows. The key
sections in Being and Nothingness (BN) are the treatment of value in Part 2, Chapter 1,
Section III (BN 84–95), and Section II of the Conclusion, on “ethical implications”
(BN 625–8). Sartre’s main published statement of his ethics is – faute de mieux, since it
was intended only as a synoptic reply to critics – the short and widely read
Existentialism is a Humanism (EH), a lecture from 1945. Simone de Beauvoir’s
Pyrrhus and Cineas (2004), ch. 3, pp. 77–150, and The Ethics of Ambiguity (1996) may
be regarded, up to a point, as an ampliﬁed statement of Sartre’s ethical outlook at
this period. So too may Jeanson 1980, which has Sartre’s own stamp of approval: see
Part 3, Chapter 3, “Moral Perspectives.” The subsequent development of Sartre’s
ideas on ethics can be followed in the posthumously published Notebooks for an
Ethics (NE) from 1947–1948. All of this comprises what has come to be known as
Sartre’s “ﬁrst ethics.” The “second ethics,” in which Sartre aﬃrms ethical conscious-
ness as a force within history, belongs to the period 1962–1965. Concerning the
unpublished material which comprises it, see Stone and Bowman 1986 and 1991. A
short extract from Sartre’s Rome lecture notes is translated as “Determinism and
Freedom.”
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Sartre’s ethics are grounded in a theoretical, indeed a metaphysical account,
not simply of human beings but of Being as such and in general. These
metaphysics are moreover highly revisionary, and ﬁercely anti-naturalistic.
Even before the virtues of those metaphysics are considered, this will
hardly recommend Sartre to contemporary moral philosophers. In response
it may be pointed out that Sartre does not stand alone: two other modern
thinkers have, like Sartre, supposed that what is essential to ethical thinking is
an unobscured perception of the nature of reality and appreciation of its
highly uncommonsensical character, namely Spinoza and Schopenhauer.7
But in any case, and this is the crucial point, if we want to understand what
Sartre is attempting to do, then it is necessary that we understand his
argument in these terms.
Sartre’s ethical theory may be viewed as a drama in three acts. As will be
seen, the analogy is appropriate, for narrative structure is integral to the way
that Sartre understands moral epistemology. The ﬁrst act clears the ground,
dispelling illusion but leaving the individual in a contradictory situation,
subject to both the necessity, and the apparent impossibility, of positing
value. The second shows that the aﬃrmation of human freedom provides
the unique means of exiting from these contradictory demands. The third,
which presented Sartre with the greatest diﬃculty and occupied the bulk of
his attention after 1945, concerns the task of translating the aﬃrmation of
freedom into concrete practical terms in our actual social and historical
situation.
PURGATION: METAPHYSICAL INSIGHT
The phenomenological ontology of Being and Nothingness rules out directly
various longstanding and widely endorsed conceptions of morality and moral
knowledge. Two metaphysical claims above all are decisive for Sartre’s rejec-
tion of a swathe of familiar positions, including hedonistic consequentialism,
sentimentalist accounts such as Hume’s, and all forms of moral realism: ﬁrst,
the impossibility of given reality’s containing any ground for value; second, the
impossibility of the self’s containing any determinate content capable of
sustaining value in a way that withstands critical examination.
Sartre holds that consciousness involves, at the most fundamental level
and as a condition for its existence, the setting into opposition of two utterly
7 Heidegger is also a contender for inclusion, though uncertainty surrounds his
endorsement of the notion of moral value.
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heterogeneous forms of being, which he famously calls being-for-itself and
being-in-itself, the latter characterized negatively by its indiﬀerence to all of
the features which are constitutive of the for-itself, including normativity and
end-directedness. A phenomenological-style transcendental argument is
oﬀered for this thesis, the implication of which is that whatever features of
the world ﬁgure objectually in consciousness as having an evaluative or
normative character must be traced back to the subject. Sartre has thus
taken seriously the Kantian lesson that moral theory cannot begin with
supposed apprehensions, whether empirical perceptions or rational intui-
tions, of the Good.8 It is noteworthy that Sartre, following Max Scheler and
going beyond Kant, accepts nonetheless that our phenomenology is axiolo-
gically rich, saturated with normativity;9 the question is what exactly within
subjectivity provides its source. And once Sartre’s full analysis of the struc-
tures of subjectivity – which occupies Part 2 of Being and Nothingness – has
been completed, we are brought to recognize that the ground of the subject’s
apprehension of value can only be choice, more precisely, the reﬂexive, self-
chosen and self-constituting project of the individual for-itself, which stands
above all eﬃcient causality, natural or supernatural.
It may be asked what justiﬁes the transition from a subjective ground for
value, a weak claim thatmanymodern ethical theories would of course accept,
to its identiﬁcation with choice, construed in Sartre’s transcendental, non-
naturalistic manner. Here Sartre’s second claim is crucial. Application of
Sartre’s dualist ontological insight to ourselves yields the radical result that
any conceptualization of our minds or personalities which involves a commit-
ment to the existence of abiding and eﬃcacious mental entities, conceived as
existing objectively beyond or outside acts of consciousness, is guilty of
hypostatization. The mind, Sartre argues, can have no intentional, representa-
tional or qualitative “content,” and can enjoy no “states” or “dispositions.”
Sartre does not doubt that we, in our ordinary experience of the world, accord
reality to such entities – they are not mere philosophical ﬁctions or inventions
of psychological science, nor are they conﬁned to the third-person standpoint.
Philosophy and psychology may aggravate our tendency to postulate such
entities, but they have their ultimate source in introspection, as ordinarily
understood, in the reﬂective endeavour to grasp howone truly is, to knowwhat
one truly feels, thinks, desires, etc. There is, therefore, an entire ontological
8 The Good, or value, is not what has being but what is beyond being and yet has-to-be,
through us: see BN 38 and NE 555–7.
9 E.g. TE 19, and BN 38–9.
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stratum aﬃrmed in the common-sense image of the world – “the psychic” or
“Psyche,” as it is termed in Being and Nothingness – which Sartre relegates to a
species of ﬁction.10 This ﬁction is not arbitrary but necessitated by the original
teleology of the for-itself, its “fundamental project,” which is to become in-
itself-for-itself or causa sui, to exist as a self-grounding entity, in which freedom
and nature are one. This unachievable end is served originally by degrading
consciousness to the immobile condition of the psychic. Such metaphysically
false self-representation is mobilized in the primary forms of bad faith, where
the human subject loses itself in images of congealed selfhood, binding itself
practically by means of a ﬁctive self-identity, disavowing its freedom and
approximating, in its experience and understanding of itself, to being-in-itself.
The implications of Sartre’s revisionary metaphysics of mind for ethical
theory are plain. If none of the qualities standardly attributed to persons and
appealed to in action explanation – states of belief, desire, and emotion;
character traits and qualities of personality – can be accorded reality, then
the dispositions in terms of which virtue theory understands morality, and
the aﬀective cum conative states that provide the foundation for anti-realist
and other Humean meta-ethical outlooks, are swept away.11
CONVERSION: AFFIRMATION OF FREEDOM
Fundamental though it may be, Sartre believes that it is possible, in a complex
and qualiﬁed sense, to suspend the original project of seeking assimilation to
the in-itself, and that the rational development of the for-itself – as it cycles
through the various forms of bad faith and becomes aware of their futility –
requires this “radical conversion.” In what Sartre calls “pure,” “purifying,” or
“nonaccessory” reﬂection, the subject repudiates the ﬁctive substratum of the
“psychic” and withdraws their commitment to whatever concrete projects
sub-serve the fundamental project.12
10 BN 158–70. 11 See EH 32–3.
12 Radical conversion involves, as it may be put, recognition of the impossibility of
happiness. It is referred to in BN 412, 464, 475–6, and throughout the Notebooks, e.g.,
NE 49, 102, 281, 406–7, 471–84, 506–7. Sartre describes it succinctly at NE 470:
“Conversion: nonaccessory reﬂection. Its motive: the impossibility of recovering
oneself. The meaning of conversion: rejection of alienation.” Concerning pure
reﬂection, see BN 155, 158–60, 199, and NE 12, 473–82, 560; the idea is ﬁrst formulated
in TE 28, in connection with Husserl’s epochê. Authenticity ﬁgures in BN almost
exclusively as a category of Heidegger’s and is employed only once by Sartre
sebast ian gardner
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The initial result of this suspension is not extinction of the drive to attain
the condition of being-in-itself-for-itself 13 but merely a dissociation from
it suﬃcient to shake its absolute hold over us. Nor is it simple cessation of
will. Sartre gives in Being and Nothingness a transcendental account of the
possibility of value from which it follows that value is constitutive of both
self-consciousness and our very being-in-the-world – it is what precipitates
consciousness’ transcendence of itself out into the world and gives it an
orientation towards the future, allowing the cogito to escape mere
instantaneity.14 Since our essential mode of being is teleological, the resig-
nation recommended by Schopenhauer as the route to salvation is not
genuinely thinkable.
The imperative to locate value thus remains in force, and if we now ask
what way forward is available for the enlightened Sartrean subject, it is clear
that identiﬁcation with some contingent desire, entity, or ideal – patriotism,
the Church, the Party – is not an intelligible option, any more than, for Kant,
pure practical reason can resolve itself into inclination. Nothing that merely
happens to be in the world, or that I happen to locate in my psyche, can exert
authority at the transcendental level.
Because the necessity of valuing does not entail logically the availability of
rationally acceptable values, thus far it remains possible that the Sartrean
subject will grind to a halt, its practical and theoretical aspects at odds with
one another. But as should be evident from the way in which Sartre has
structured the development of the for-itself – as an axiological via negativa –
there is one remaining candidate, namely human freedom itself, and once its
candidacy is recognized, aﬃrmation of freedom cannot fail to follow.15 Here
it is crucial to recognize that when freedom advances to occupy the vacant
axiological spot, no discursive justiﬁcation – no conceptual linkage of free-
dom with the Good – is either oﬀered by Sartre, or needed: aﬃrmation of
freedom proceeds directly from grasping correctly one’s metaphysical nature
himself (at BN 70, where it is deﬁned as the self-recovery of corrupted being), but
becomes part of Sartre’s own philosophical vocabulary in Existentialism is a
Humanism and the Notebooks (see, e.g., NE 474–82).
13 NE 37: “The converted man cannot suppress the pursuit of Being through conver-
sion.” See also NE 473.
14 See BN 84–95.
15 Recognition of the necessity of aﬃrming freedom is barely distinct, if at all, from
insight into its necessity, i.e. our being “condemned” to be free, a constant refrain in
Sartre’s writings.
Sartre
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and situation.16 This reﬂexive turn gives the for-itself a kind of formal
completeness, something akin to the self-coincidence of the in-itself which
it has renounced, yet is not undertaken for that reason: the negative motive,
of escaping the contradiction of having to value and yet ﬁnding everything
but freedom ineligible, suﬃces to force through the aﬃrmation of freedom.17
The passages in which Sartre may appear most candidly subjectivist18
should therefore not be read as meta-ethical analyses, as if Sartre were
clumsily attempting to formulate the doctrines of emotivism or prescripti-
vism, nor as implying that Sartre supposes values to be chosen in the ordinary
sense of a choice of furniture coverings. Sartre’s concern, when he talks of the
“unjustiﬁability” of commitments, is to correct themode of our consciousness
of value in such a way that the sustaining role of our freedom in axiological
consciousness becomes phenomenologically manifest: Sartre seeks to modify
the way in which we hold values, in order that it should display correctly,
make visible, their only possible motivation. It is helpful to regard Sartre in
Kantian terms as asserting the transcendental ideality of value per se, contra the
tendency of natural consciousness to handle values in reﬂection as if they had
transcendental reality, the “spirit of seriousness,”19 as Sartre calls it; Sartre
considers that this transcendental ideality must be explicit in the phenomen-
ology of valuing.20
It may seem that further work needs to be done if Sartre is to arrive at an
ethical destination: commitment to the value of my freedom must be shown
16 Strictly, in so far as the “grasping” is no mere theoretical cognition, the two are
identical. The ontological novelty which is involved in aﬃrming freedom, as
opposed to simply being free and knowing oneself as such in a merely abstract
discursive manner, consists in the appearance of a new demand, freedom having
become the object of reﬂective thetic consciousness (see BN 94–5). In Hegelian
terms, freedom has become “conscious of itself.” Sartre makes it very clear that this
presupposes metaphysical insight at the deepest level: “the original structure of
authentic existence [. . .] is indissolvably linked to the consciousness of Being as a
ﬁxed explosion” (NE 493–4).
17 Grounding ethics directly on metaphysical facts, without intervening justiﬁcatory
practical argumentation, is the explicit strategy of Schopenhauer’s On the Basis of
Morality, and implicitly that of Spinoza in Part 4 of the Ethics.
18 E.g., BN 464–5. 19 BN 626.
20 Sartre in one place suggests that the tendency to reify values – to regard them as
transcendentally real – derives not originally from the hypostatizing motive of the
fundamental project, but from the fact that their origin lies in pre-reﬂective con-
sciousness, which can only posit values out in the world, in objectual form: see NE
559. The fundamental project merely ratiﬁes this transcendental illusion of the
natural attitude.
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to lead to aﬃrmation of the other’s freedom. But again it would be a mistake
to regard this as a logical gulf which needs to be bridged by argumentative
means, for once again we ﬁnd that the negative work of purgation has
covered the distance. The purged for-itself’s self-conception is in an impor-
tant sense non-egoistic. Each (purged) for-itself grasps itself under that uni-
versal and grasps its own freedom as indiscriminable from that of every other
individual for-itself. While certainly for Sartre being-for-itself is individuated –
the subject is not a self-less or impersonal consciousness; being-for-itself takes
necessarily the reﬂexive form of an ipseity21 – the subject who has emanci-
pated herself fully from the aim of becoming causa sui is left with no purchase
on their individuality relevant to the positing of value: “self-interest” has for
them, at the transcendental level at which axiological reﬂection is here
proceeding, no special claim to attention.22 Thus no aﬃrmation of my free-
dom in opposition to that of other for-itselfs makes sense. This explains also
Sartre’s repeated claim that in choosing for myself I choose for all men.23
What it is to pursue this task of aﬃrming freedom in a universal form has
yet to be determined, but two points need attention if aﬃrmation of freedom
is to be ethically meaningful.
No positive contentful account of freedom, on a par with Kant’s identiﬁca-
tion of freedom with autonomy and hence with morality, is given by Sartre.
Sartre’s clearly stated view is that no analysis of or even conceptual approx-
imation to freedom is possible: freedom has no inner constitution or essence
which philosophical reﬂection might determine; not even freedom of will
provides its correct conceptualization.24 The blankness of Sartrean freedom
fosters the suspicion that aﬃrmation of the other’s freedom is incapable of
bearing practical implications, and that any claim to that eﬀect will involve a
surreptitious exchange of the ontological freedom of the for-itself, which is all
that has been in question hitherto, for freedom in some more empirically
determinate sense.25 The point that needs to be made in response is that all
21 BN 102–5.
22 The plane of reﬂection here is “beyond egoism and altruism” (BN 626). See Sartre’s
repudiation of the theory of amour propre in TE 17–20.
23 Whereby freedom is converted directly into responsibility; see BN 553–6, EH 23–5,
44–5, andNE 107, 248, 250, 493. Regarding the universality claim, see “Existentialism:
A Clariﬁcation” (Sartre 2013), p. 89, EH 24, 43–5, NE 557, and “Kierkegaard: The
Singular Universal” (KSU), pp. 424–5.
24 BN 24–45, and Part 4, Chapter 1, Section I (BN 433–81).
25 Sartre distinguishes freedom in such a sense, and makes clear that it is not what is at
issue, at BN 483.
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that is required for the ethical project to be launched is that we should know
freedom negatively, in terms of its opposition to the mode of being of the in-
itself: it is enough that we can recognize cases where it is negated. The
contentlessness of Sartrean freedom is not just the source of its privileged
status but also integral to its axiological role at this initial level of ethical
thinking: the primary expression of the ethical is resistance to the temptation
of bad faith, which entails resistance to incursions of the fundamental project
in one’s relation to others. Once this basis has been laid, the material and
other factical dimensions of human reality can be brought into view and the
concrete demands of freedom extrapolated.26
A second point concerns the accessibility of the other’s freedom at the level
of concrete interaction. Sartre takes a famously pessimistic view of the
possibility of interpersonal fulﬁlment in his discussion of “concrete relations
with others” in Being and Nothingness, where the dynamics of personal
relationships are analyzed in terms of a ﬁxed set of conﬂictual and self-
stultifying strategies. This account of interpersonal desire is grounded in
intersubjective awareness, which according to Sartre necessarily alternates
between consciousness of my freedom and that of the other, and does so in
such a way that not only can they not both be co-present to my conscious-
ness, but each can be present only on the basis of a negation of the other. This
structure intersects with the demands of the fundamental project to yield the
projects of love, hate, indiﬀerence, and so on. Now, if the other’s freedom is
something that I must in any concrete context either seek to negate, or that
I can aﬃrm only at the expense of my own, then ethical action is no less
impossible than the fundamental project. It is consequently vital that Sartre’s
thesis concerning the mutually repelling character of my freedom and that of
the other has only limited scope. Sartre’s primary purpose in the section in
question is to counter Hegel’s “ontological optimism,” his claim that the
supra-individual logic of interpersonality necessitates, independently of
choice, accession to relations of mutual recognition. This leaves space,
conceptually, for the possibility of mutual recognition of freedom on some
other basis, and here Sartre is able to reinvoke his concept of purifying
reﬂection: just as, in the intra-subjective context, in order to resist the
temptation of bad faith, I am required, and able, to hold my transcendence
26 This involves reworking critically the familiar categories of ethical theory. Sartre
does this in the Notebooks: see, e.g., the treatment of rights, justice, and charity in
NE 137–41.
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and my facticity in equilibrium,27 so similarly, in the intersubjective context,
I am able to cognize the other’s freedom as coexistent with my own.
Interpersonal pathology, the “Hell of passions,”28 may be the original but it
is not the ﬁnal form of intersubjectivity.29
The freedom of the other is thus a possible object of my will. The question
then arises whether Sartre wishes also to conceive it in stronger terms, as either
the fulﬁlment (as some sort of extension or deepening) of my freedom, or as in
any sense a condition for it. Sartre’s texts do aﬃrm a deep interconnection of
individuals’ freedom,30 but on the fundamental issue Sartre remains opposed
to Hegel: the individual’s freedom, like their self-consciousness, is ontologically
independent of the other, not created or constituted by it,31 and the prospective
gains of reciprocal freedom, whatever theymay be, are not part of the primary
motivation for aﬃrming freedom; the other’s willing my freedom is not a
condition of my being free. What is true is that the other’s relation to my
freedom – whether they too aﬃrm it, or remain caught in the fundamental
project – plays an essential role in determining how far I can get with the
ethical task of willing freedom for its own sake, of realizing freedom as a
universal value: the imperative of the converted subject is to render human
reality transparent to freedom, to inhabit a world irradiated by it, and in that
regard the freedom of each is indeed conditional on that of the other.32 As will
be seen shortly, the implications of this point are far-reaching.
What we have just seen is Sartre’s core argument for the value of freedom,
which he supplements and elaborates in several ways. Two of the most
important are Sartre’s introduction of the auxiliary motive of solidarity,
and his notion of a shared project of unveiling being. The former urges us
to as it were unite in light of our common human condition and in face of
27 Facticity and transcendence “are and ought to be capable of a valid coordination”
(BN 56). The intersubjective analogue of good faith is described at NE 468: a
“perpetual tension” which takes account of both freedoms.
28 NE 499.
29 Sartre explains what it is for intersubjectivity to have a mutually recognitive
character in NE 499–508; here he introduces the concept of authentic love. His
later account of reciprocity, in Critique of Dialectical Reason (Sartre 1982), pp. 209–15,
involves a change of view: Sartre now regards a mediating third element – roughly:
materiality as it relates to some praxis – as a condition of mutual recognition.
30 See EH 48–9, andWhat is Literature? (WL), ch. 1, concerning the interaction of writer
and reader.
31 BN 239.
32 Dependence on the freedom of the other is emphasized by de Beauvoir in 2004,
Part 2, and 1996: 67–72.
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our common enemy – the fate we share of being condemned to exist
teleologically in a reality indiﬀerent to teleology, as if enduring a cosmic
punishment, and to always feel the magnetic pull of the fundamental
project, this ineradicable disposition inhabiting us like original sin.33 The
pathos of Sartre’s vision is thus complex – tragic, adversarial, Augustinian,
Promethean – and forms a vital component of his ethical outlook.34
The latter reworks a theme from Heidegger. Sartre aﬃrms, as a subaltern
end to that of freedom, that the for-itself must understand itself as committed
to the project of “illuminating” – revealing, disclosing – being, and that this is
necessarily a shared human endeavour. The project of illuminating being
comprises cognition and praxis, is extended through history, and involves
intersubjective norms; it presupposes a stance of epistemic generosity and
implies a commitment to the value of truthfulness.35
DECISION: THE PROBLEM OF REALIZING FREEDOM
IN ACTION
To aﬃrm freedom as value – since this is in itself no merely cognitive act,
value having the exigent character of a demand and not the given character of
an object36 – can have no other meaning than to act in ways that express
(realize, embody) that value. The diﬃculty is to determine which acts satisfy
this description. It is here that the problems of ethical life begin, and that
Sartre diverges most sharply from Kant.
Kant supposes that the conditions for freedom-embodying action are
(i) the conformity of its maxim to the formal conditions expressed by the
categorical imperative, (ii) the motivational suﬃciency of this conformity for
the agent. A continuous logical transition from freedom, or pure practical
reason, to situationally determinate moral judgements is secured according
33 NE 479: “conversion consists in renouncing the category of appropriation, which
can govern only those relations of the For-itself with things, in order to introduce
into the internal relation of the Person the relation of solidarity, which will
subsequently be modiﬁed into solidarity with others.” Sartre explicates approvingly
Kierkegaard’s treatment of original sin in KSU; on what it encompasses, see NE 428.
34 For a characteristic, purple passage, see the long note in WL 23–5.
35 See in particular Truth and Existence (Sartre 1992b), esp. pp. 5–7, 45–8, 64–7. The theme
of disclosure of being is emphasized by de Beauvoir in 1996, ch. 1. In theNotebooks, the
unveiling of being, creation, and generosity or giving comprise a family of inter-
related concepts: the for-itself grasps the necessity of reproducing its own gratuitous,
quasi-creative relation to being in its relation to others, i.e., in generosity.
36 BN 38.
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to Kant by applying the formula(e) of the categorical imperative to whatever
empirical content contingently presents itself, i.e., to the facts of inclination
and circumstance considered in light of the actual laws of nature.
Sartre stands in line with those, beginning with Hegel, who believe that
Kant’s procedure is unable to yield determinate practical judgements. In his
1945 lecture Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre recapitulates and endorses
Kant’s claims concerning the foundational role of freedom, the strictly uni-
versal character of moral judgement, the concept of self-legislation, and the
ideal of a kingdom of ends,37 but at the same time argues that the abstract
formulae of Kant’s categorical imperative fail to provide a suﬃcient basis for
practical decision-making: nothing in them connects adequately with the
complexity of a concrete historically conditioned situation.38
This is, as just noted, a familiar criticism of Kant. But Sartre also has other
(and in his terms deeper) reasons for rejecting Kant’s conﬁnement of ethics to
formal maxim-determination.
In the ﬁrst instance, Sartre’s attitude to Kant’s ethics is critical: abstract
moral rules exhibit a ﬁxity and opacity alien to freedom, and in Kantian duty
we relate ourselves to an Other, not to ourselves.39 Again we see that Sartre’s
objection is not to the objectivity of ethics but to the mode in which we take
up or “live” the ethical, and speciﬁcally to its objectiﬁcation – which has the
eﬀect of undercutting the only possible source of its objectivity, viz. freedom.
The expulsion of being-in-itself must be carried through with respect to
morality itself, that is, morality must present itself and be apprehended in
the correct, unmystiﬁed form; it must not degenerate into an inert social
object, dissociated from the spontaneity of consciousness.40
Most importantly, Sartre considers that the good will of the Kantian agent
encounters the following diﬃculty:
37 EH 41–53. Sartre also takes over Kant’s notion – in his account of the “fact of reason” –
that awareness of a categorical imperative indexes the unconditional possibility of
action in conformity with it, i.e. of (what Kant would call) transcendental freedom:
see “Determinism and Freedom” (DF).
38 EH 30–2, 46. Decision-making can therefore only be a matter of judgement, “like
constructing a work of art” (EH 45–6). The universal validity that our actions lay
claim to is, therefore, the Kantian “exemplary necessity” of beautiful objects.
39 See DF 246, 252, and NE 469: duty is “a thing. Duty is the Other at the heart of my
Will. It is the project of my will conceived of as the project of an Other.”
40 In so far as the primary condition of moral agency is an orientation not susceptible
to discursive formulation, Sartre comes into contact with the tradition of virtue
ethics. Of relevance here is Sartre’s focus on generosity: see NE 9, 48, 129, 141, 197,
281, 375, 470.
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If the city of ends remains a feeble abstraction, it is because it is not realizable
without an objective modiﬁcation of the historical situation. Kant, I believe,
saw this very well, but sometimes he counted on a purely subjective
transformation of the moral subject and at other times he despaired of
ever meeting a good will on this earth . . . [T]he purely formal intention of
treatingmen as ends . . . reveal[s] itself to be utterly futile in practice since the
fundamental structures of our society are still oppressive. Such is the present
paradox of ethics; if I am absorbed in treating a few chosen persons as
absolute ends, for example, my wife, my son, my friends, the needy person
I happen to come across, if I am bent upon fulﬁlling all my duties toward
them, I shall spend my life doing so; I shall be led to pass over in silence the
injustices of the age, the class struggle, colonialism, Anti-Semitism, etc., and,
ﬁnally, to take advantage of oppression in order to do good. Moreover, the former
will be found in person to person relationships and, more subtly, in my very
intentions. The good that I try to do will be vitiated at the roots. It will be
turned into radical evil.41
The Kantian might well retort that Sartre overshoots the mark: if ethics is
presently paradoxical, then it is presently impossible, which is an absurdity;
the sane conclusion is surely that, however resistant the social world may be
to moral endeavour, we can at least strive to possess a good will. This
however merely leads to the deeper issue contained in Sartre’s remarks on
Kant, indicated by Sartre’s ominous reference to the presence of oppression
“in my very intentions,” and developed at great length in the posthumously
published manuscripts from 1947–1948, Notebooks for an Ethics.
The post-conversion subject faces the task of targeting the freedom of the
other across the medium of a world – the world interposes itself between
subjects and constitutes the platform of human action; our interaction is not
that of intelligible beings in a spirit-world. The problem is that the world of
our facticity, which deﬁnes our situations and which my good intentions
must traverse, is populated by entities which negate freedom. Earlier we said
that reﬂective consciousness posits for itself a ﬁctive mental substratum. In
Sartre’s full view these posited objects have, notwithstanding the ﬁctiveness
which they exhibit when considered transcendentally, intersubjective reality
(Sartre gives the example: “I do everything possible to ‘make Annie love me’, to
41 WL 274–5. In Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr, Sartre writes: “The ethical ‘problem’
arises from the fact that Ethics is for us inevitable and at the same time impossible.
Action must give itself norms in this climate of non-transcendable impossibility” (p.
186n). Adorno picks up the same theme when he asserts that the false life cannot be
lived correctly. That this impossibility implies practical contradictions – seeking to
treat man as an end, yet being unable to do so – Sartre spells out in NE 207.
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‘endow her with love for me’”).42 These intersubjectively real entities are
moreover only the beginning of a social ontology replete with objects
antagonistic to freedom, which Sartre in his later writings calls the “prac-
tico-inert” and which range frommachine tools to language, ritual, and social
identities (“the Jew” of anti-Semitism, etc.). What all of these items have in
common is an abiding objectivity endowed with normative power that
appears to transcend – even though it must have its source in – the con-
sciousness of individuals. The importance for Sartre of the fact that the social
world has an aspect of being-in-itself cannot be overstated. Sartre’s Critique of
Dialectical Reason represents perhaps the most intensive engagement in the
history of philosophy with the transcendental problem of social ontology,
that is, the question of how it is possible for a plurality of individuals to give
rise to social things, trans-personal entities capable of reacting back on
individual subjectivity. Whether or not Sartre solves the problem, the
Critique succeeds at least in displaying the contradictory structure of inter-
subjective life, its combination of free subjectivity and nature-like objectivity,
and in delineating the ways in which alienation is bound up with material
scarcity and collective oppression.43
With this in view, it can be understood why Sartre considers naive Kant’s
view that the kingdom of ends can be approximated to, simply to the extent
that each person has a good will. The problem is the translation of aﬃrmation
of freedom into concrete mundane facticity, and this cannot be secured by
the mere existence of individual freedom-aﬃrming wills, when the very
42 BN 159.
43 Though it should be clear from the foregoing why Sartre should have availed himself
of certain Marxist concepts – alienation, exploitation, mystiﬁcation, reiﬁcation – it is
less obvious, fromwhat has been said so far, why any more substantial commitment
toMarxism should have been taken out by him. The short answer is that, on the basis
that (1) the “lack of being” in the for-itself, considered at the more concrete level of a
human being, is in the ﬁrst instance the material need of a living organism (a claim
which departs from Being and Nothingness and signals a development in Sartre’s
thinking), and that (2) the fundamental terms in relations of oppression are social
classes, Sartre believes that ethics leads into a broadly Marxist politics. The problem
of human history and collective existence does not however originate ultimately for
Sartre in material forces, any more than it does in the game-theoretic considerations,
modelled in rational decision theory, which have driven so much political theory: its
roots are once again metaphysical, lying ultimately (as for Schopenhauer) in the fact
that being-for-itself is a totality which has been “detotalized,” i.e. subjected to
individuation. The “antinomic” structure of intersubjectivity, which sets a limit to
Hegel’s dialectic, is analyzed at BN 299–302 and again at NE 450–68.
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conceptualizations that each must form of the other in order to formulate an
intention towards them, and the means that they must adopt in order to
execute their intention, are infected with being-in-itself, that is, negate the
other’s freedom. Since these accretions of being-in-itself are ﬁrst and fore-
most the product of man’s collective historical existence, ethics must develop
to that higher plane:
[T]he suppression of alienation has to be universal. Impossibility of being
ethical alone. Whence the problem: History↔ ethics. History implies ethics
(without universal conversion, no sense or meaning to evolution or to
revolutions). Ethics implies history (no morality is possible without systema-
tic action in some situation).44
The diﬃculty that Sartre discovers in the task of ethics helps to explain
why he did not directly publish an ethical sequel to Being and Nothingness –
not because, as his critics would have it, he discovered its metaphysics to be
ethically fruitless, but because the task of concrete ethical action in his
estimation leads directly into a politics and theory of history, which he
attempted to provide in his Critique of Dialectical Reason.45 The metaphysics
of Being and Nothingness, far from precluding ethical engagement with the
world, motivate it so strongly and in such demanding terms that nothing less
than a resolution of the problem of human history and collective existence
will permit realization of man’s ethical telos. This expansion of the borders of
ethics beyond the pre-political individual puts Sartre in a recognizable tradi-
tion beginning with Rousseau and stretching up, via Schiller, Schelling,
Hegel, and Marx, to Adorno.
ABBREVIATIONS
BN Being and Nothingness (Sartre 1995)
DF “Determinism and Freedom” (Sartre 1974)
EH Existentialism is a Humanism (Sartre 2007)
KSU “Kierkegaard: The Singular Universal” (Sartre 1983)
NE Notebooks for an Ethics (Sartre 1992a)
44 NE 471. See also NE 7, 9, 13, 141.
45 The ﬁrst volume of this work appeared in 1960, and the second, composed in 1958–
1962, was published posthumously in 1985. It thus precedes Sartre’s “second ethics,”
which may be regarded as an attempt to integrate the Critique’s theory of society
and history with ethics. The reason for Sartre’s non-publication of his second ethics
is unclear.
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